Great products fail in weak companies. Mediocre products win in strong companies.
CSIRO invented the core wireless system design that is the basis of all high-speed WiFi generations. The breakthrough emerged from Australian research excellence, achieving technical validation and patent protection. Sydney startup, Radiata, licensed the patent and produced the world’s first high speed WiFi chips. Yet WiFi only became ubiquitous after Cisco acquired the technology and deployed it through global distribution networks, enterprise customer relationships, and 24/7 technical support infrastructure spanning 165 countries.
The difference at Cisco wasn’t technical capability. CSIRO’s research was world class. Radiata’s chip technologies were ground-breaking. The difference was commercial infrastructure to translate technical innovation into market reality. Australia’s innovation policy consistently overlooks the fundamental reality that commercial success depends as much on who’s commercialising the innovation, as what’s being commercialised.
Time and time again we see excellent technologies languishing in organisations without strong commercial expertise. Equally we often see mediocre products with significant market share due to the commercial experience of the supplier.
Current policy obsesses over Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) while ignoring this critical commercial dimension. The missing element in Australia’s innovation evaluation is recognising that innovation success operates on two dimensions, not one.
Beyond linear TRL thinking
Policy frameworks treat commercialisation as the logical next step after technological development, extending NASA’s Technology Readiness Levels toward “commercial readiness” as if success follows a predictable sequence: reach TRL 9, attract customers, demonstrate market viability, generate commercial outcomes.
This linear thinking partly explains why Australia produces world-class research that struggles to yield commercial value. We evaluate technologies independently from the organisations attempting to commercialise them. Research institutions excel at advancing TRL levels. Policy makers fund demonstration projects proving feasibility. Yet the assumption that commercial adoption will follow technical validation is naive.
Companies (not projects) carry innovations across the valley of death. Projects end regardless of technical success; companies endure, navigating commercialisation with the capabilities and discipline necessary for sustained market development.
But here’s where current policy thinking needs refinement: not all companies possess the capabilities to commercialise all innovations successfully. The critical question isn’t just whether the technology is ready, but whether the organisation commercialising it has capabilities aligned with what that specific innovation requires for market success.
The multiplication framework
Innovation success operates on two axes: technical readiness and commercial maturity. The horizontal axis represents traditional TRL progression from laboratory concepts toward market-ready product. The vertical axis, which policy frameworks consistently underemphasise, represents the commercial maturity of the organisation attempting commercialisation.
Combined Innovation Success Potential = TRL × Company Commercial Maturity
This is multiplication, not addition. That distinction matters.
Commercial Maturity encompasses organisational capabilities needed to convert technology into market value. These vary by industry, but typically include five critical dimensions:
Market Access – Distribution channels appropriate for the product category, customer relationships in target segments, geographic presence in relevant markets, and regulatory navigation expertise for the industry.
Technical Integration – Supply chain management, manufacturing know-how, quality assurance systems for the product category, and integration with existing technologies.
Financial and Operational Infrastructure – Funding capacity for scale-up, working capital for inventory and receivables, operational systems supporting the business model, and risk management appropriate to product characteristics.
Organisational DNA Alignment – Decision-making speed matching market dynamics, talent in relevant domains, culture supporting required innovation types, and incentives aligned with success.
Brand and Market Positioning – Credibility in target customer segments, brand associations supporting value propositions, narrative capability for paradigm shifts, and customer relationship management systems.
The critical insight reshaping evaluation: organisations with high commercial maturity in dimensions relevant to specific innovations can successfully commercialise technologies at lower TRL levels. Conversely, technically mature innovations often fail when commercialising organisations lack aligned capabilities.
Why multiplication matters
Strong technology cannot compensate for weak commercial capabilities in relevant domains. Strong commercial capabilities can overcome moderate technological positions but cannot commercialise non-functional technology.
If we extend the logic in a literal sense, TRL 8 × Commercial Maturity 3 = 24. Compare this to TRL 5 × Commercial Maturity 7 = 35. The moderately developed technology in a commercially capable organisation has higher success potential than advanced technology in a commercially weak organisation. Strong commercial capabilities can overcome moderate technological positions but cannot commercialise non-functioning technology.
The WiFi story demonstrates this pattern precisely. Australian research achieved TRL 8-9 results: functioning technology and enforceable patents. Yet WiFi became globally ubiquitous only when Cisco’s enterprise customer relationships, global distribution networks, technical support capabilities, and systems integration with existing networking infrastructure translated technical achievement into market reality.
The multiplication framework explains why Australian innovations consistently migrate offshore to companies with relevant commercial capabilities, returning as imported products developed from Australian intellectual property. The issue is not our research quality but our failure to develop or partner with firms that have the commercial maturity needed.
Patterns across industries
Pharmaceuticals show this pattern clearly. Small biotechnology companies develop breakthrough drug discoveries, achieving technical validation through early clinical trials, but rarely deliver products without partnering with large pharmaceutical companies.
Big Pharma’s commercial maturity for drug commercialisation includes regulatory expertise developed through decades of submissions, Phase 3 clinical trial infrastructure requiring $100 million-plus investments, manufacturing facilities meeting stringent quality compliance requirements, global distribution networks connecting to hospitals and pharmacies, sales forces with established physician relationships, and insurance reimbursement negotiation skills.
Technical innovation alone cannot navigate this commercial complexity. Small biotech consistently partners with or gets acquired by larger pharmaceutical companies not because Big Pharma conducts superior research, but because drug commercialisation requires commercial capabilities that develop through sustained market participation in that specific domain.
This pattern is seen across most knowledge-intensive sectors. The capabilities required differ by industry, but the fundamental principle remains: technical readiness alone doesn’t determine commercial success. Organisational capabilities aligned with specific innovation requirements multiply the value of technical achievements.
Australian evidence of multiplication effects
In Australia we see these dynamics in medical devices and biotechnology. Cochlear, ResMed, and CSL built world leadership not on unmatched research but on sustained investment in commercial infrastructure: regulatory navigation, clinical validation, distribution, and global market development. Their success came from multiplying good science by high commercial maturity.
Cochlear entered hearing implant markets with technology at approximately TRL 7, facing significant technical challenges. Cochlear’s commercial infrastructure for medical devices – international regulatory navigation experience, clinical validation partnership capabilities, distribution networks connecting to audiologists and ENT surgeons, and systematic global market development – enabled technology refinement while building a dominant market position.
Competitors developed technically superior alternatives over subsequent decades. None captured comparable market share because technological advantage alone doesn’t determine commercial success in medical devices. Cochlear’s commercial maturity in dimensions relevant to hearing implants multiplied the value of incremental technology improvements, creating competitive advantages that pure technological development couldn’t match.
ResMed’s sleep medicine success follows a similar pattern. The company systematically integrated technologies developed through research collaborations, translating discoveries into commercial products serving global markets. ResMed’s capabilities in regulatory approvals for medical devices, clinical evidence development, distribution connecting to sleep clinics, and customer relationship management multiplied the commercial potential of technologies that might have remained research results without appropriate commercial partnership.
CSL’s biotechnology leadership illustrates how financial strength and commercial infrastructure relevant to pharmaceutical development enable systematic translation of early-stage research into products generating billions in revenue. The company’s capabilities in clinical trials, regulatory pathways, manufacturing scale-up for biologics, and international market entry strategies led to commercial successes that few organisations could replicate despite accessing similar technological opportunities.
These Australian companies succeeded not because they possessed superior research capabilities compared to universities, but because their commercial maturity in dimensions relevant to their industries multiplied the value of their technologies.
Scale doesn’t equal commercial maturity
Large incumbents are not automatically commercially mature for every innovation. Traditional automakers had far reaching capabilities but they were optimised for internal-combustion vehicles, not electric ones. Yet Tesla achieved a dominant position in electric vehicles despite the incumbent apparent disadvantages.
This apparent contradiction actually strengthens the multiplication framework. Traditional automakers had the wrong type of commercial maturity – capabilities aligned with internal-combustion vehicles, not electric ones.
Vast dealer networks became liabilities when franchise agreements legally prevented direct sales and dealers resisted electric vehicles that generated lower service revenue. Manufacturing expertise optimised for engines and transmissions proved irrelevant for electric powertrains. Supply chains built around ICE components required complete reconstruction. Engineering talent specialised in combustion couldn’t easily pivot to battery chemistry and software integration.
Tesla built commercial capabilities aligned with electric vehicle requirements: software integration expertise from Silicon Valley rather than Detroit, direct-to-consumer sales models avoiding dealer conflicts, battery supply chain management through vertical integration, charging infrastructure development treating the network as product rather than afterthought, and brand building making sustainability aspirational rather than sacrificial.
These examples demonstrate the critical distinction that commercial maturity isn’t about size or incumbent position, but rather, it’s about possessing organisational capabilities aligned with what specific innovations require for market success. Traditional automakers had the wrong type of commercial maturity.
We see similar patterns in other disrupted industries. Nokia, Kodak, and Blockbuster all had scale yet lacked alignment with emerging paradigms. Their commercial maturity was for the wrong product architecture. Nokia possessed commercial maturity in hardware-focused mobile phones but lacked capabilities for software ecosystem management. Kodak invented digital cameras but maintained commercial infrastructure optimised for film sales. Blockbuster had extensive retail presence when video streaming required different capabilities entirely.
Scale and incumbency often create organisational antibodies preventing necessary pivots. Sunk costs in existing infrastructure, compensation structures tied to legacy measures, and decision-making processes optimised for mature product evolution all work against developing capabilities aligned with new innovation requirements.
Commercial maturity that matters is capability alignment with specific innovation requirements, not absolute size or market position.
Policy implications for evaluation
Current policy approaches in Australia evaluate technologies apart from the commercial maturity of those advancing them. Grants reward TRL progression; success is measured by technical milestones. The commercial capability of the proponent organisation is rarely examined.
A fundamental change is needed. Evaluation must instead consider both axes. Assessment criteria should explicitly examine whether potential partners possess:
- Market access capabilities,
- Technical integration and manufacturing know-how,
- Financial and operational infrastructure,
- Organisational alignment, and
- Brand credibility in the relevant market.
These factors predict commercial success more accurately than technological readiness metrics alone. Policy frameworks that systematically connect research institutions with commercially mature Australian companies will allow research results to reach markets through established capabilities.
As competency analysis has established, research excellence requires different skills from commercial translation. The multiplication framework provides evaluation methodology for leveraging these complementary capabilities rather than expecting individual organisations to excel at incompatible competencies.
The Australian opportunity
Australia has both world-class research capabilities and commercially mature companies across multiple sectors. The WiFi story demonstrates both strengths and the gap between them. The opportunity lies not in more research funding or TRL advancement but in connecting research excellence with relevant commercial capabilities.
Countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Denmark demonstrate that sustained national competitiveness comes from linking these two dimensions. Australia can do likewise by recognising that innovation success depends on multiplication, not addition.
Assess both technological potential and commercial maturity of partners. Support partnerships that combine them. Measure outcomes across both dimensions and reap the benefits: technologies commercialised, revenue generated, markets reached, companies scaled.
Combined Innovation Success Potential = TRL × Company Commercial Maturity
WiFi succeeded globally when Australian technical excellence met global commercial capability. The same principle applies across all innovation: only by multiplying relevant capabilities can we turn great research into enduring commercial success.